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In late 1944, two legendary generals stood at the helm of the Allied Expeditionary Force as it plunged into
Nazi Germany in an effort to end the Second World War. While the relationship between the United States
and Britain, and more specifically the relationship between Generals Dwight Eisenhower and Bernard
Montgomery are portrayed as cooperative, smooth, and friendly, personal memoirs of the two men and their
close confidants reveal that these myths could not be further from the truth. A debate between the two men,
which began as one regarding military strategy, escalated into a full blown feud; this tension was a reflection of
the overlaying tensions of a changing Western world.
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The Allied victory over the Axis powers in the Second World War is arguably the most 
significant triumph of the free world over regimes of oppression and fascism in modern world 
history. At the nucleus of the Allied forces stood two esteemed generals: Dwight D. Eisenhower 
of the United States, and Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, affectionately called “Monty”, 
of Great Britain. Both men had established significant, arguably legendary, military reputations 
within the global sphere. To the common public, they stood as figureheads of Western 
superpowers joining forces to defeat a common evil. The narrative of the Eastern theatre’s end is 
today practically common knowledge: with the Americans, Canadians, and British approaching 
across France from the west and the Russians pressuring the Germans from the east, the Nazi 
forces eventually crumpled and surrendered by May of 1945. While the Allied powers did indeed 
join forces, fought, and died together to defeat Adolf Hitler, the strategic journey to the point of 
victory was anything but smooth. What began as a fundamental strategic disagreement between 
Eisenhower and Montgomery after the Normandy campaign evolved into a bitter war of words 
between the two men, with the British and American press as well as other generals chiming in 
and taking sides in the feud. The two men entered the war as allies and emerged as victors, but 
the disagreement and controversy between the two men left behind a strained and bitter legacy 
despite their victory, and revealed a broader thematic tension between the two nations the men 
fought for. With the United States emerging as the premier power of the Western capitalist world 
and the British empire in an unprecedented decline, the clash between Eisenhower and 
Montgomery represented the subconscious power struggle between the two nations that 
epitomized a changing world in the mid-20th century. 
 By the end of August 1944, the Normandy campaign was effectively finished, with 
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Allied forces sweeping across northeastern France and into Belgium. The German army was 
thinning and swiftly retreating. To many, it seemed as if the war would effectively be over by 
Christmas of that year.1 While the offensive appeared to be running smoothly, the Allied 
Expeditionary Force (AEF), halted in the face of a difficult decision to be made. The farther and 
farther the Allies pushed into the heart of Nazi territory, the longer their supply lines extended. 
By September, AEF supply lines had stretched to nearly 300 miles, and it became clear that the 
Allied offensive could not continue until Eisenhower, Montgomery, and the rest the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) determined a plan for the invasion of 
Germany and defeat of the Nazi army.2 
A full month before the first Allied soldier landed on the beaches of Normandy, 
Eisenhower had crafted a strategy for ending the war. His ‘broad front’ strategy directed the 21st 
Army Group, consisting of British and Canadian armies, under Montgomery, to travel north of 
the Ardennes across Belgium and the Netherlands. Meanwhile, American General Omar 
Bradley’s 12th Army Group would advance south of the Ardennes, through southern Belgium 
and Luxembourg. Once both armies had broken through the German defenses in the Ruhr valley, 
Montgomery and Bradley would turn their armies to face each other, creating a double 
envelopment that every military commander dreamed of, with the surviving German forces 
helplessly sitting in the center. Eisenhower envisioned that this pincer movement would swiftly 
destroy the German army and bring an end to the war.3 
To many, Eisenhower’s strategy seemed to be a more than adequate plan to defeat Hitler.                                                         1 Carlo D’Este, “A Lingering Controversy: Eisenhower’s ‘Broad Front’ Strategy,” Armchair General, last 
modified October 7th, 2009, http://www.armchairgeneral.com/a-lingering-controversy-eisenhowers-broad-
front-strategy.htm.  2 John Buckley, Monty’s Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 2013), 203.  3 Jonathan W. Jordan, Brothers, Rivals, Victors: Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, and the Partnership that 
Drove the Allied Conquest in Europe (London, Penguin Books Ltd, 2011), 391.  
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Montgomery, however, had other ideas. In his eyes, the best strategy to finish the war lay in a 
‘narrow front’ approach. Monty wanted to take a group of 40 divisions in a compact and 
concentrated thrust across the Rhine, with the intent of overpowering the German army in one 
quick strike, capturing Berlin, and hopefully ending the war by the end of 1944.4 Montgomery 
voiced his evident disagreement with Eisenhower’s plan, and outlined in a note to the Supreme 
Commander his justifications of the narrow front strategy: 
1. The quickest way to win this war is for the great mass of Allied armies to 
advance northwards, clear the coast as far as Antwerp, establish a powerful air 
force in Belgium, and advance towards the Ruhr.  
2. The force must operate as a whole, with great cohesion, and be so strong that 
it can do the job quickly.  
3. Single control and direction of the land operations is vital for success. This is 
a whole time job for one man.  
4. The great victory in N.W. France has been won by personal command. Only 
in this way will future victories be won. If staff control of operations is 
allowed to creep in, then quick success becomes endangered.  
5. To change the system of command now, after having won a great victory, 
would prolong the war.5  
Montgomery argued that a full-fledged, forty-division plunge into the heart of Germany “would 
be so strong that it need fear nothing.”6 Montgomery’s note to Eisenhower reveals three 
principle desires by the British general: a swift and efficient victory, a concentration of power, 
and above all, Montgomery at the helm of the offensive. In his memoirs written after the war, 
Montgomery defended his strategy by tying together the urgency of bringing the war to a swift 
end with the general welfare of the British people. He juxtaposed the current situation in his 
home country with that of the United States, saying,  
The more I considered [the broad front strategy], the more certain I was that it 
was wrong. The British economy and man-power situation demanded victory in                                                         4 Buckley, 204.  5 Bernard L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. 
(London, Collins Clear-Type Press, 1958), 267-8. 6 Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York, Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2002), 596. 
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1944: no later. Also, the war was bearing hardly on the mass of the people in 
Britain; it must be brought to a close quickly. Our “must” was different from the 
American must: a difference in urgency, as well as a difference in doctrine. This 
the American generals did not understand; the war had never been brought to their 
home country. Why should we throw everything away for reasons of American 
public opinion…Indeed my plan offered the only possibility of bringing the war 
to a quick end.7  
Montgomery was adamant about his disapproval for the broad front plan, and indeed he was not 
alone in his opinion. In an August 28th, 1944 entry in his personal diary, British Field Marshal 
Sir Alan Brooke voiced his concerns with Eisenhower’s plan as well:  
[Eisenhower’s plan] is likely to add another three to six months on to the war. He 
straight away wants to split his force, sending an American contingent towards 
Nancy whilst the British Army Group moves along the coast. If the Germans were 
not as beat as they are this would be a fatal move; as it is, it may not do too much 
harm. In any case I am off to France to-morrow to see Monty and to discuss the 
situation with him.8  
With their opposition loudly voiced, a strategic clash between British and American leadership 
appeared to be inevitable. Montgomery’s passionate advocacy for a strategy that would bring the 
swiftest end to the war possible for the sake of his British people reflects a broader and more 
alarming tension arising within the SHAEF: while Eisenhower, Montgomery, and the rest of 
Allied leadership were fighting a common enemy, their allegiance and pride to their homelands 
remained paramount. Indeed, the defeat of the Nazis remained the principle objective, but the 
question of which general would lead the charge in defeating the Germans, how, and in what 
way would begin to arise as a polarizing controversy within the Allied headquarters.  
 On September 1, 1944, another controversial decision was made that would bring the 
friction between Eisenhower and Montgomery to new levels. Prior to August 1st of 1944, 
Montgomery had exercised operational command of both British and American forces, and 
                                                        7 Ibid, 270-1. 8 Arthur Bryant, Triumph in the West: 1943-1946 (London, Collins Clear-Type Press, 1959), 262-3.  
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navigated the Allied Expeditionary Force (AEF) to a decisive victory during the Normandy 
breakout. However, on 1 September  Eisenhower assumed command of all AEF ground forces 
from Montgomery. In one swift leadership change, Eisenhower had deflated the prestige of 
Montgomery, the hero of El Alamein, commander at Normandy, and Britain’s most revered 
commander. There was certainly fair reasoning regarding Eisenhower’s decision to change 
SHAEF leadership. In his book, Eisenhower Versus Montgomery: The Continuing Debate, G.E. 
Patrick Murray explains the political framework behind the change in leadership: 
In a military alliance between nations, command takes on political ramifications. 
By prior agreement between Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the position of supreme commander went to an American 
because the United States would eventually provide the bulk of troops and 
supplies.9   
Despite the seemingly necessary political motivators behind the command change, Montgomery 
was far from reserved with his comments and opinion regarding this new development. It was of 
Montgomery’s opinion that Eisenhower should stick to handling the political and logistical 
aspects of the campaign, and that in terms of a change in command, it would be “inefficient and 
dangerous to swap horses midstream.”10 Confiding privately to BBC reporter Chester Wilmot 
after the war, Montgomery was much less civil with his words for Eisenhower, claiming that 
Eisenhower: 
Had not the experience, the knowledge, the organization, or the time. He should 
have been devoting himself to questions of overall strategy, to political problems, 
and to problems of inter-Allied relations and military government….Instead he 
insisted on trying to run the land battle himself. Here he was out of his depth and 
in trying to do this he neglected his real job at the highest level.11  
Alan Brooke chimed in with his own commentary, writing in his memoirs that Eisenhower was                                                         9 G.E. Patrick Murray, Eisenhower Versus Montgomery: The Continuing Debate (Westport, 
Connecticut, Praeger, 1996), 1-11.  10 Ibid, 15.  11 D’Este, 596. 
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“essentially a staff officer with little knowledge of the realities of the battlefield…obsessed with 
the logistical problems.”12 Coupling these comments with the nature of his strategy, it is evident 
that Montgomery desired to be in supreme command of Allied forces in the defeat of Nazi 
Germany.  What had begun as a disagreement on strategy was beginning to spiral into a battle 
within the SHAEF for whose nation would ultimately spearhead the defeat of Nazism and 
emerge as the savior of the free world.  
  Montgomery had made clear his thoughts regarding both the command change and his 
preferred strategy. While he tried to emphasize the importance to him and Great Britain a 
strategy and leader that would end the war before the end of 1944, other Allied leaders suspected 
ulterior motives. In an act of stubborn protest, Montgomery refused to attend Allied meetings 
and ceremonies in Paris in wake of the change in leadership, to the irritation of much of the 
SHAEF leadership. Monty’s bitterness towards the decision was a staunch dismissal of the 
importance of Anglo-American cooperation, as well as the idea that the AEF was a joint force 
that relied on compromise, a principle that Eisenhower constantly preached.13 Montgomery’s 
selfishness and desire for control was met with criticism from the American press, who were 
under the impression that Monty was trying to take credit for winning the war on the backs of 
American troops. In his book Brothers, Rivals, Victors: Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, and the 
Partnership That Drove the Allied Conquest in Europe, Jonathan Jordan writes of his suspicion 
of Montgomery’s motives, stating, “Montgomery didn’t need the title of ground commander to 
accomplish his objectives, and the only obvious use for an enlarged authority would be to shut 
down his allies while his own army group raced for Berlin.”14  
                                                        12 Bryant, 262. 13 D’Este, 601.  14 Jordan, 394.  
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 Eisenhower’s decision-making process was not purely militaristic, as many political 
factors influenced the creation of the broad front strategy. Principally, Eisenhower, being the 
affable compromiser he was, wanted to ensure that each SHAEF commander would play a role 
in the final push for victory. In explaining Eisenhower’s thinking, Stephen Ambrose writes:  
No matter how brilliant or logical Montgomery’s plan for an advance to the Ruhr 
was (and a good case can be made that it was both), and no matter what 
Montgomery’s personality was, under no circumstances would Eisenhower agree 
to give all the glory to the British, any more than he would agree to give it to the 
American forces. But as things stood Eisenhower could not make his decisions 
solely on military grounds. He could not halt [American General George Patton] 
in his tracks, relegate [Omar Bradley] to a minor administrative role, and in effect 
tell [US Army Chief of Staff George Marshall] that the great army he had raised 
in the United States was not needed in Europe.15  
Moreover, Jonathan Jordan writes that it would be unacceptable and a disrespect to American 
forces and leadership to let Montgomery romp through Germany with his British armies, while 
over a million American soldiers watched from the sidelines.16  
 Eisenhower’s patience in dealing with Montgomery’s stubborn and notoriously conceited 
personality, as well as his awareness of the political implications of how victory would be 
achieved should be commended and appreciated. Indeed, he found himself in a difficult position 
in which he couldn’t fully please anyone. On one end, Eisenhower had to withstand 
Montgomery’s fervent criticism of his leadership, character, and strategy. On the other hand, 
despite holding his ground against the protests of Brooke and Montgomery and sticking to his 
broad front strategy, Eisenhower still drew flak from the American press, who tabbed him as 
overtly pro-British for compromising and still giving Montgomery a significant role in the 
offensive.17 As is evident from the attacks by the American press, the United States was just as 
                                                        15 D’Este, 603.  16 Jordan, 395.  17 Murray, 14.  
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guilty as Montgomery and Great Britain for wanting to have a larger than equal slice of the 
victory pie.  
 History tells us what happened next. With Eisenhower sticking to his guns and 
establishing his broad front, the AEF forces eventually overpowered the Nazi forces in Western 
Germany while the Russian army captured Berlin in the east. Despite the heated gridlock 
between SHAEF leadership that often cast a dark cloud over the Allied advance, the ability of 
Montgomery, Eisenhower, and the hundreds of other commanders to eventually come together 
and defeat the fascist powers of Europe will forever stand as a lasting testament of freedom and 
democracy trumping regimes built on hate and oppression.  
 It goes without saying that both Eisenhower and Montgomery shared the same military 
objectives with regards to ending the war. What the feud between the two men truly reflects is 
the political implications of victory that both rarely admitted yet subconsciously prioritized. The 
overwhelming American military superiority compared to that of Great Britain, which the 
American press repeatedly noted, served as a constant reminder of the United States’ rising 
presence as a premier global superpower. Contrarily, the Second World War is commonly 
acknowledged as a watershed moment for Great Britain: while its contributions to the war effort 
were both critical and immense, Britain would emerge from the war impoverished, destroyed, 
and a shell of its former self. Montgomery’s passionate resistance of Eisenhower’s strategies and 
decisions serves as evidence of his awareness of Britain’s diminishing global status. It is easy to 
criticize Montgomery and dismiss him as arrogant, ignorant, and unlikeable, but it is clear that in 
the end he was simply a man who wanted to bring immortal glory to his withering home.    
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